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INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF A UNITED  
STATES UNILATERAL TROOP REDUCTION  
FROM THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY  
ORGANIZATION

DORR JAMES DEWAR, JR.

1973

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The Graduate School of Public Affairs  
University of Washington

INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF A  
UNITED STATES UNILATERAL  
TROOP REDUCTION FROM THE  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

MARCH, 1973

DOREL JAMES DEWAR JR.

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May, 1972

The assumptions upon which the economic, military, political and psychological consequences of a U.S. unilateral troop reduction from Europe were based in this study may prove to be unfounded should a true rapprochement emerge as a result of recent international developments: the Chinese-Soviet summits conducted by President Nixon, the ratification of Chancellor Brandt's West German-Soviet treaty, and the newly signed Berlin accord. As with any international treaty or agreement, however, time becomes the true determinant whether it will succeed or fail. Until a witnessed relaxation of tensions occurs throughout the world, it is felt that any precipitate movement on the part of the United States with regard to troop reductions from Western Europe could well lead to the type of repercussions presented in this study.

January, 1973

Although the research and factual material presented in this essay was prepared in late 1971 and early 1972, it is felt the conclusions remain viable and pertinent. The numerous developments in international affairs which occurred in late 1972 and early 1973 no doubt would temper the projections offered by this analysis, however, time, as previously stated, remains the true determinant of success or failure. These developments therefore serve merely as additional inputs into our judgment and evaluation processes. It remains my opinion that any precipitate US action with regards to its NATO commitment could well lead to those types of repercussions discussed in this essay.

D. J. DEWAR JR.



In this age of negotiation and reevaluation, there has been considerable political debate in the United States Congress concerning the reduction of the American military influence throughout the world. As the American people have become more and more disenchanted with the military entanglement in Southeast Asia, greater support has been rendered for the argument that the United States badly needs to reevaluate its foreign policy objectives, hence its military commitments. It is the aim of this study to analyze the possible implications and/or consequences of a United States unilateral troop reduction from Western Europe, more specifically, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

As an introduction into the study, it would be well to briefly review a few international developments and to observe how the current Soviet threat is perceived. Since its inception in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been successful in safeguarding the security of the North Atlantic area. Sustained peace, prevailing in Europe for more than a quarter of a century, has established such a high level of security that some Americans, and Europeans, feel that the threat of a Soviet bloc attack upon Western Europe is extremely improbable. To those proponents of US military reductions, it is accordingly unnecessary for the United States to continue to maintain the degree of military commitment it has maintained to Europe in the past. Senator Mansfield, long a proponent of US troop reductions, claims that an American withdrawal might additionally provide the impetus the Western Europeans need to develop their own defense capabilities in line with their respective needs. A careful consideration of this argument need be made--after all, Czechoslovakia--1968, is surely not ancient history. The Czechoslovakian invasion, in addition to clearly



indicating to the world that the Soviet Union had not relinquished its use of armed force in achieving its political objectives, questioned Western Europe's vulnerability to a conventional attack from the East.

In the past several years, partly due to its involvement in Middle East affairs, the Soviet Union has established a strong military presence in the Mediterranean. In addition to the NATO naval forces operating in the Mediterranean, Italy, Greece, and Turkey, all NATO allies, have become aware of the strength of the Soviet fleet. Its expansion, combined with the continuing reduction of US naval strength, has transformed the Mediterranean from what was once referred to as a "NATO lake" into a sea of superpower rivalry.<sup>1</sup>

The recent increases in strength and numbers of the Warsaw Pact forces also gives credence to the belief that the communist threat still exists. It might perhaps be interpreted differently than it was in 1945, but the present threat is none-the-less still very real.

In 1968 at Reykjavik, Iceland, the Foreign Ministers of NATO agreed to maintain the existing level of forces in the Alliance while at the same time recognizing the need for some type of balance in the military forces of the two blocs. In October of 1969, the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact nations met in Prague to discuss the possibilities of an all-European security conference. No mention was made of the United States or Canada in these discussions, however, little doubt existed that either would be excluded from the proposed conference.<sup>2</sup> Since 1969, the North Atlantic

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<sup>1</sup>"Key Area Where U.S. is Slipping: Meaning of Russian Gains in Mediterranean," U.S. News and World Report, March 20, 1972, pp. 38-41.

<sup>2</sup>U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe, Report of Special Study Mission to Europe by Hon. Leonard Farbstein, New York, Chairman Sub-committee on Europe, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., March 29, 1970 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 2-3.



Council has also conducted studies on the questions of force reductions. NATO has been trying unsuccessfully to obtain an invitation to Moscow for its former secretary-general, Manlio Brosio, who was supposed to represent the Western allies in preliminary discussions on troop reductions. The Soviets have persistently avoided inviting Brosio to Moscow and have blatantly ignored and sidestepped the NATO overtures.<sup>3</sup>

In light of these international developments, the question then becomes: Is it wise at this time for the United States to substantially reduce its military commitment to NATO and to the Western European defense structure?

At this time it is felt that a pertinent, and often overlooked, question should be discussed: What is meant by the term "substantial" when referring to proposed US military reductions?

Several definitions could be given, however, it is significant to acknowledge the goal desired by reducing the troop levels. As numerous goals can be formulated, each requiring varying amounts of troop reductions, for the sake of summarization, they shall be divided into three broad categories. They are not however, meant to be rigid or exclusive.

The first might be an outright reduction of at least 150,000 troops now stationed in Europe. By demobilizing them upon their return to the United States, overall US defense appropriations and foreign exchange expenditures would be significantly reduced. "Substantial" with this goal in mind would be at least 150,000 troops.

A second proposal, aimed solely at domestic US budgetary expenditures, might be to leave the troops which are stationed in Europe at approximately

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<sup>3</sup>"European Home Armies Target of Red Proposal," Seattle Post-Intelligencer, January 26, 1972.



the same level while demobilizing those forces which are stationed in the United States and ear-marked for NATO's use. "Substantial" in this instance would be defined in terms of reserve forces committed for NATO's useage. Due to the conflict in Southeast Asia, many of these reserve forces have been transferred outside of the United States. The specific number remaining in the US and ear-marked for NATO is therefore difficult to calculate. Once the US extricates itself from Southeast Asia however, the numbers of forces reserved for NATO will be considerably more than those currently stationed in Europe.

The third broad proposal might be the reduction of 50,000 to 75,000 troops currently stationed in Europe. Reductions would be conducted on a highly selective basis so as not to impair the combat capability of the remaining troops. Reductions could be accomplished by minimizing the non-combatant troops; relocating headquarter facilities, or entirely eliminating them; turning over US military support jobs to local nationals; in short, eliminating the duplication of effort, time, and money. This proposal presents the advantage of reducing both the United States exchange deficits and the domestic budgetary expenditures without severely jeopardizing any US combat capability. "Substantial" in this instance would be between 50,000 and 75,000 troops.

Senator Mansfield, concerned about both the total US budgetary expenses and the foreign exchange deficits, gave his own definition of "substantial" in his proposed amendment to the Military Selective Service Act of 1967. He stated 150,000 troops were sufficient to honor the United States troop



commitment to NATO.<sup>4</sup> As roughly 300,000 US troops are presently stationed in Europe, "substantial" for the senator is 150,000 men.

It is apparent then, that no definite figure can be, or has been, agreed upon as to the precise number of troops involved in "substantial" reductions. For purposes of this study, 150,000 men, or approximately one-half of the present US commitment, shall be considered "substantial."

Although many important and difficult issues exist in any reassessment process, an attempt will be made to analyze those questions considered basic to US-European relations:

What effect would a substantial US unilateral troop reduction have upon East-West relations in general? Would it disrupt the current European economic status quo? Would it impel NATO allies in Europe to increase their military contributions to the Alliance? Would a reduction substantially ease the dollar drain from the US balance-of-payments deficit? What effect would it have on American credibility throughout Europe? ... the world? What impact would a US troop withdrawal have upon the overall security of Europe? Would it disrupt the present military balance-of-power in favor of the East? Would a vacuum be created in the European defense structure? Would it politically fragment Western Europe? Would it strengthen or weaken NATO's posture and the opportunities for detente? Would US leadership in the Alliance be seriously questioned? Would a reduction strengthen the

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<sup>4</sup> U.S., Congress, Congressional Record, "Text of the Mansfield Amendment (No. 86)," 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1970), CXVII, No. 68, p. S6679. In Section 401(b) of his proposed amendment, Senator Mansfield proposed that "no funds appropriated by Congress may be used after December 31, 1971, for the purpose of supporting or maintaining in Europe any military personnel of the U.S. in excess of 150,000." See Appendix I.



currently emerging fears that the US is adopting a new'isolationist foreign policy doctrine? Would it appear that the current NATO strategy is being altered back to its former one of "massive retaliation?" Would significant reorientations in both European and US policies take place? Would NATO allies in Europe seek to ease relations with the Soviet bloc nations? What problems would result as a readjustment occurred? Inflation? Unemployment? Would it appear as if the US Congress was dictating American foreign policy? Would it accomplish what the present Administration is seeking in its new low profile approach to foreign policy? What economic repercussions might be experienced between Europe and the United States?

These are some of the more searching questions which need to be considered in any decision concerning substantial US force reductions. As a prelude to their discussion, however, several related topics need to be analyzed. Because foremost in a foreign policy decision of this magnitude is the mood, attitude, and/or feeling of the United States Administration, a brief analysis of President Nixon's attitude toward US commitments in Europe is offered. An additional factor which should be established is the degree to which the United States is presently involved in NATO. Specific numbers on US troop and defense expenditures are accordingly outlined. A concluding section is concerned with the military balance that exists between the NATO allies and the Warsaw Pact nations.



PRESENT ADMINISTRATION POLICY TOWARD  
U.S. FORCE LEVELS IN EUROPE

Although there have been slight but steady reductions in the number of troops stationed in Europe over the past several years (in 1966 there were still close to 400,000 men stationed in Europe as a result of the build-up during the Berlin crisis of 1961-1962), the present Administration does not appear to be planning substantial withdrawals from Europe in the immediate years to come. On several occasions President Nixon has expressed both his belief in NATO and his commitment to maintain approximately the same force levels in Europe. In a post-inauguration speech in January of 1969, he told the North Atlantic Council:

In creating new policy making machinery in Washington, one of my principal aims has been to shift the focus of American policy from crisis management to crisis prevention. That is one of the reasons why I value NATO so highly. NATO was established as a preventative force; and NATO can be credited with the fact that, while Europe has endured its share of crises in the past twenty years, the ultimate crisis that would have provoked a nuclear war has been prevented. Those nations that were free twenty years ago are still free today. Thus, in its original purpose, NATO has been a resounding success: Europe and America have proved that the dream of collective security can be made a reality.<sup>5</sup>

In April of the same year, he once again addressed the Council. On that occasion he reemphasized the US support for NATO.

NATO is needed; and the American commitment to NATO will remain in force and remain strong. We in America continue to consider Europe's security as our own.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup>"President Nixon's Remarks to the North Atlantic Council: February 24, 1969," Department of State Bulletin, 60:250-252 (March 24, 1969).

<sup>6</sup>Richard M. Nixon, "NATO: The Need for Unity," Vital Speeches of the Day, XXXV, No. 14 (May 1, 1969).



During his trip to Western Europe and the Mediterranean in the fall of 1970, President Nixon spoke to reporters in Ireland in the following terms:

Considerable concern, I find, has arisen among many of the NATO nations, the major nations and the smaller NATO nations, as a result of some comments by political figures in the United States as well as some of those commenting upon the American role in the world, that the United States might not meet its NATO responsibilities and was on the verge of reducing its contribution to NATO. I stated categorically to the NATO commanders, and I do here publicly again, that the United States will, under no circumstances, reduce, unilaterally, its commitment to NATO. Any reduction in NATO forces, if it occurs, will only take place on a multi-lateral basis and on the basis of what those who are lined up against the NATO forces--what they might do. In other words, it would have to be on a mutual basis.<sup>7</sup>

In an article printed in the November 9, 1970, edition of the New York Times, political editor William Beecher stated that Defense Secretary Laird personally favored pulling out 20,000 to 40,000 supply troops from Europe at an estimated annual saving of \$200 to \$300 million. According to Beecher, State Department officials opposed the move because it would undermine Allied confidence in the United States' determination to keep its NATO commitment. He also reported that President Nixon opposed the idea of withdrawing these large numbers of troops at the present time. In disagreeing, President Nixon was hoping that, if political stability were maintained, Europeans and Americans might possibly be able to reach an accord on mutual and balanced force reductions and strategic arms limitations.

President Nixon's resolve was again confirmed by Secretary of Defense Laird who stated on November 30, 1970, just prior to his departure for the

<sup>7</sup> Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (October 12, 1970), p. 1333.



North Atlantic Council meeting in Brussels, that the Administration's intention to maintain the same force capabilities in Europe would be reflected in the budget request to Congress for Fiscal year 1972. On December 3, 1970, in a message read by Secretary of State Rogers at the opening session of the same North Atlantic Council's meeting, President Nixon stated:

We have agreed that NATO's conventional forces must not only be maintained, but in certain key areas strengthened. Given a similar approach by our Allies, the United States will maintain and improve its own forces in Europe and will not reduce them unless there is a reciprocal action from our adversaries. We will continue to talk with our NATO allies with regard to how we can meet our responsibilities together.<sup>8</sup>

Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in April of 1971, also reiterated President Nixon's resolve.

The goal of the Department of Defense is to assure a defense capability to the US and its friends and Allies around the world adequate to provide the realistic deterrence which will enable us to achieve the President's aims of peace in our generation.<sup>9</sup>

Once again, in his 1972 State of the Union message, President Nixon repeated the necessity of maintaining America's dominant military strength as the greatest possible guarantee of world peace.<sup>10</sup>

From the preceding examples, it would appear that President Nixon intends to keep the US troop commitments to NATO at roughly the same level during the remainder of his first term in office. In doing so, he has

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. (December 7, 1970), pp. 1620-1621.

<sup>9</sup> U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, Hearing, Part I, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., April 27-29, May 4-6, 1971 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 52.

<sup>10</sup> William Randolph Hearst Jr., "Our Number One Priority," Seattle Post-Intelligencer, January 23, 1972.



attempted to reassure the US allies that a precipitate unilateral reduction of US forces from Europe would not occur. Any future decision to carry out troop withdrawals would be made only on a basis of mutual consultation with US allies and a reciprocal reduction on the part of Warsaw Pact forces. In addition to stating that US troop levels would be maintained, the NATO allies have been instructed that the US expects them to continue to maintain and improve their own troop strengths.

This reassurance on the part of President Nixon does not however mean that long-range changes are not being contemplated for the future. The Administration is well aware of the strong pressures, not only in the United States, but in all NATO countries, to devote a larger proportion of the national budget to domestic, social and economic needs. In early 1969, President Nixon initiated overtures that hinted at the possibility of a reassessment of American foreign policy towards Western Europe. Stressing the idea that current alliances must be pragmatic and flexible, he stated:

In today's world, what kind of an alliance shall we strive to build? I believe we must build an alliance strong enough to deter those who would threaten war; close enough to provide for continuous and far-reaching consultation; trusting enough to accept a diversity of views; realistic enough to deal with the world as it is; flexible enough to explore new channels of constructive cooperation.<sup>11</sup>

Former Undersecretary of State Elliot Richardson, addressing the International Studies Group of American Political Scientists Association convention in New York in September of 1969, also hinted that a possible reevaluation might occur. He implied that any foreign policy not capable of flexible adjustments was in trouble almost by definition.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Richard M. Nixon, op. cit.

<sup>12</sup>Elliot L. Richardson, "The Foreign Policy of the Nixon Administration: Its Aims and Strategy," Department of State Bulletin, 61:257 (September 22, 1969).



One of the main themes in both President Nixon's State of the Union message of January 1970, and of his Congressional report in February 1970, was that a reevaluation of the present US involvement in international affairs was underway. On these occasions, unlike any previous proclamations, he stressed the importance that US allies must assume additional determination of their destinies. He stated in his State of the Union message that both the US and Europe felt that Western Europe could and should assume additional responsibility for their defense.<sup>13</sup> Although this was not a declaration by the United States' Administration that cuts were to be made in US forces in Europe, President Nixon's "New Strategy for Peace" did hint at the possibility.

A more balanced association and a more genuine partnership are in America's interest. As this process advances, the burden and responsibilities balance must gradually be adjusted to reflect the economic and political realities of European progress.<sup>14</sup>

He reaffirmed however, his pledge that the US would not isolate itself from the affairs of Europe.<sup>15</sup>

Stronger emphasis was apparent in his report to Congress on the "United States Foreign Policy of the 1970's." In it he reemphasized:

Our allies are no longer willing to have the alliance rest only on American prescriptions--and we are no longer willing to have our alliances depend on their potency and sustenance primarily on American contributions.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (January 26, 1970), p. 59.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. (February 23, 1970), p. 204.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. (February 23, 1970), p. 205.

<sup>16</sup> "Partial Text of Nixon's Foreign Policy Report," Seattle Post-Intelligencer, February 10, 1972.



As illustrated, President Nixon has been attempting since 1969 to stress the importance of an American foreign policy doctrine founded on principles of flexibility, pragmatism, and cooperation. Despite the pledge of the European NATO allies to boost their contribution to the common defense by an additional \$1 billion over the next five years, internal US pressures for reducing the military budget are only likely to grow.<sup>17</sup>

In addition to stressing the importance of reevaluating American foreign policy objectives, Administration officials are considering whether technological advances in weaponry and the prospect of an improved situation in Europe might not warrant the adoption of a new military strategy for NATO. As the present strategy of "flexible response," requiring that NATO be prepared to fight both a large-scale conventional war and a nuclear war, appears questionable, a new strategy, hopefully, would not only be militarily effective against the Soviet nuclear capability, but also less expensive to maintain. In a letter to Secretary of Defense Laird, Senator Mansfield voiced his opinion that the present strategy did not appear adequate to respond to the needs of the current threat.

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<sup>17</sup> General Andrew J. Goodpaster, "Why the U.S. Will Not Take G.I.'s out of Europe Now," U.S. News and World Report (December 7, 1970), p. 59. NATO allied leaders pledged to assume a greater share of the defense burden by offering \$1 billion over the next five years for defense spending. West Germany agreed to contribute \$100 million for an integrated communications system, an aircraft shelter program, and various other defense projects. Italy, Netherlands, and Denmark offered small contributions for qualitative changes, and Britain pledged 4 additional close-air support squadrons. The British additionally agreed to avail a reserve armored regiment and the aircraft carrier Ark Royal. All of these pledges contributed substantially to the improvement of the NATO infrastructure and national forces.



I am increasingly doubtful of the ability of our large conventional forces to offer any effective non-nuclear flexible response to Soviet conventional attack. If our conventional forces must in fact depend on early use of even low-yield nuclear weapons to carry out their mission and survive, I fail to see how this provides for any form of flexibility in the manner of our response to aggression. Such early use of even tactical nuclear weapons would clearly open a nuclear war which would quickly escalate.<sup>18</sup>

William Beecher also reported that the National Security Council was examining several options for a new strategy which would adjust to the growth in Soviet nuclear power and to the decline in the forces and funds being devoted by NATO members to their non-nuclear forces.<sup>19</sup>

Among the options under consideration is one which would employ a long-range withdrawal of up to 250,000 of the close to 300,000 troops still stationed in Western Europe. Heavy reliance would be placed on clean tactical nuclear weapons. Proponents of this view contend that the present tactical nuclear weapons stockpiled in Western Europe are obsolete and, if used, would likely entirely destroy the area NATO is supposed to defend, that is, West Germany. Even if it is possible to develop "clean" nuclear weapons with a low yield, ensuring low collateral damage, any emphasis on their construction would imply a readiness to employ them at the outset of an attack.

At the other extreme of options under consideration is the so-called "firebreak" strategy which would emphasize building conventional forces for

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<sup>18</sup> U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, "Letter: Reduction of U.S. Troops in Western Europe--exchange between Senator Mansfield and Melvin Laird," 92d Cong., 1st Sess., (1971), CXVII, No. 69, p. S6809.

<sup>19</sup> William Beecher, "U.S. Conducting a Broad Review of NATO Strategy," New York Times, November 9, 1970, p. 12.



a conventional war of 90 days or more. Such a strategy would necessitate American troop levels to be at least 250,000 men. Nuclear weapons would be used only as a last resort.<sup>20</sup>

Somewhere between these two extremes lies the current NATO strategy of flexible response with its nuclear credibility and between 150,000 and 200,000 troops. Any minor skirmish would be met with minimal force, while a massive conventional attack would be met at a fairly early date with tactical nuclear weapons.

Thus, while the Nixon Administration is prepared to maintain the present NATO force level in keeping with the current strategy of flexible response, a major reappraisal of the strategy itself is liable to occur. Taking into account political, economic, and military realities of the 1970's, a major decision on US troop levels could occur at any future date. Although the general scale of American international involvement is already witnessed to be on the decline, President Nixon's speech of June 1969 clearly states that America will not, under any circumstances, alienate itself from the world.

Imagine for a moment, if you will, what would happen to this world if America were to become a dropout in assuming the responsibility for defending peace and freedom in the world. As every world leader knows, and as even the most outspoken critics of America would admit, the rest of the world would live in terror.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> S. L. R. Harrison, "Nixon Era and NATO," NATO's Fifteen Nations, Vol. 14, No. 5 (October-November, 1969), p. 16.



## U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN NATO

### U.S. Troops Stationed in Western Europe

Recent official figures place the number of US forces stationed in Western Europe at about 300,000 men. Approximately 250,000 of these men are assigned to the European Command (USEUCOM) and 50,000 men are attached to non-USEUCOM commands.<sup>22</sup> Although no official country by country breakdown is available, the London Institute for Strategic Studies places the majority of these forces in West Germany--roughly 200,000 men.

In addition to the 300,000 military troops, there are approximately 251,000 other military-related US personnel in Europe: 24,000 civilians working for USEUCOM and 227,000 dependents of US servicemen.<sup>23</sup>

### U.S. Defense Expenditures for Western Europe

Estimates of all direct, United States' NATO-related expenditures range from twelve to fourteen billion dollars annually. This excludes the American nuclear strategic forces expenditures which would be maintained regardless of the US conventional commitment to Western Europe. Two figures however, which when properly defined, are applicable to US defense spending toward the common defense in Europe. In February 1970, before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, both of these values were

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<sup>22</sup>The European Command (USEUCOM) is composed of all commands located within Western Europe, Spain and the Mediterranean (i.e. the US naval 6th fleet), whereas non-USEUCOM commands are those commands composed of personnel, although physically stationed in Europe, who are engaged primarily in intelligence and communications activities and report directly to agencies located within the United States.

<sup>23</sup>(1) U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe, United States Troop Levels in Europe: Report on Staff Survey Mission to Europe, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., May 2-24, 1970 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 5.

(2) London Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1970-1971 (London, 1970), p. 3.



submitted and explained by Mr. Hillenbrand, the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

The first figure, \$2.9 billion annually, includes:

1. the cost of maintaining all the US military and civilian personnel actually located in Western Europe;
2. the cost of operating and maintaining the facilities used by these personnel;
3. all operating costs for the United States' Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.

This figure, however, does not include major procurement costs and indirect logistics and administrative expenditures for support from outside Western Europe.

The second figure is approximately \$14 billion annually. In addition to the \$2.9 billion required for the European-based forces, this value includes:

1. the expenditures required for maintaining all US general purpose forces not actually stationed in Europe but maintained primarily for usage in a European emergency (these forces consist of considerably more divisions and naval strength than those that are stationed in Europe);
2. the costs of all US-based support for these US-based reserve troops;
3. a considerable share of the estimated training costs for both the US-based and the European-based forces;
4. expenditures for the US military aid program.

This figure, however, excludes expenditures incurred by the Department of Defense for military research and development, retired service personnel's pay, and all civilian and military pay increases. In short, the \$14 billion figure represents approximately what would be saved if all US NATO-oriented forces and support troops were entirely deactivated.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>24</sup> U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe, United States Relations with Europe in the Decade of the 1970's, Hearing, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., February 17-April 9, 1970 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 33-34.



In fiscal 1969 it was estimated that the United States defense expenditure entering the international balance-of-payments in Western Europe was approximately \$1.6 billion. With cash receipts of almost \$0.8 billion, a deficit of \$0.8 billion resulted. Matters became more severe in fiscal 1970 when the total deficit of US defense spending in Europe grew to \$0.9 billion.<sup>25</sup> As a result of this deficit, there has been considerable support for the belief that annual costs could be reduced if US forces were returned from Europe and were stationed intact and ready for a possible rapid return to Europe. A 1969 study of budgetary savings from dual-basing one division illustrated that some savings would result.<sup>26</sup> The Department of Defense however disagreed when substantial numbers of troops were considered. It maintained that the cost to station these troops in the United States would increase due to the requirement for two sets of equipment: one in the US for training purposes, the other in Europe for combat usage.<sup>27</sup> The concept of pre-positioning the equipment was additionally criticized. It was felt that the United States would have limited chances of succeeding in a conventional European war unless sufficient warning was given well in advance of actual hostilities. It therefore seems apparent that any reduction in US defense expenditures would occur only if the troops returning from Europe were either entirely demobilized or completely removed from the reserve ranks of the US NATO forces. The possible consequences of an action such as this will be discussed later.

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<sup>25</sup> U.S., Congress, Farbstein, op. cit., p. 13.

<sup>26</sup> U.S., Congress, House, United States Relations with Europe in the Decade of the 1970's, p. 459.

<sup>27</sup> U.S., Congress, Farbstein, op. cit., p. 12.



It is well to note at this time that the balance-of-payments deficit may also be different than the US defense deficit. This is due to additional factors which are taken into account in calculating the total balance-of-payments deficit. One factor, for example, might be the effect that the foreign exchange earnings from the US defense expenditures in Europe have on American commercial exports. Additionally, US defense expenditures are used to hire "local" personnel to staff the Department of Defense positions throughout Europe. From fiscal 1969 to fiscal 1970, these expenditures increased some \$20 million to a total of \$280 million.<sup>28</sup> It is therefore not possible to precisely predict the net effect the US defense expenditures have on the overall US balance-of-payments problem.

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<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p. 13.



## MILITARY BALANCE IN EUROPE

Any assessment of the military balance between the NATO forces and the Warsaw Pact involves a comparison of the strengths of men and equipment, including nuclear weapons; consideration of geographical advantages; deployment and training schedules; logistic support capabilities; and the variations of ideologies. As the relationship between the East and the West is unpredictable, these values are difficult to quantify.

### Ground Forces

The ground forces commands are basically divided into three geographical regions for NATO: Northern, Central, and Southern. Overlapping coverage problems exist as the Northern command covers not only Norway but also the Baltic region. The Soviet Union faces a similar dilemma in that specific circumstances may determine whether Warsaw Pact forces are committed to the Baltic area or to Germany. For this reason, the Institute for Strategic Studies grouped the Northern and Central commands into one homogeneous entity.

### Ground Formations

Category	No./Cent. Europe <sup>29</sup>		So. Europe <sup>30</sup>		
	NATO W.P.	(USSR's)	NATO	W.P.	(USSR's)
<b>Ground forces available</b>					
to Commanders in peace-time (division equiv.)					
-armored	8	31	(19)	6	12
-infantry, mechanized and airborne	16	38	(21)	28	22
					(30)

<sup>29</sup> Includes, on the NATO side, the commands for which the Allied Forces Central Europe and Allied Forces Northern Europe commanders have responsibility. France is not included. On the Warsaw Pact side it includes the command for which the Pact High Commander has responsibility, but excludes the armed forces of Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. Soviet units normally stationed in Western USSR and such troops as might be committed to the Baltic theater of operations have, however, been included on the Warsaw Pact side.

<sup>30</sup> Includes, on the NATO side, the Italian, Greek, and Turkish land forces and such American and British units as would be committed to the Mediterranean theater of operation, and on the Warsaw Pact side, the land forces of Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania, and such Soviet units normally stationed in Hungary and Southern USSR as might be committed to the Mediterranean theater.



If French formations (not part of NATO's integrated command structure) were included, two mechanized divisions would be added to the NATO totals.<sup>31</sup>

As these figures do not reflect accurate quantitative values for the size of each bloc's division, the comparison is slightly misleading. It would therefore be more advantageous to compare the total numbers of available men.

Manpower (figures in thousands)

Category	No./Cent. Europe.			So. Europe		
	NATO	W.P.	(USSR's)	NATO	W.P.	(USSR's)
Combat and direct support troops available	580	900	(585)	525	370	(75)

If French forces were included, the NATO figures for Northern and Central Europe would be increased by perhaps 40,000 men.

As the mobilization of reserve units and the movements of reinforcements would drastically affect these figures, it is well to investigate the mobilization capacities of each bloc. It has been estimated that the force of 31 Soviet divisions in Central Europe might be increased to 70 in well under a month if mobilization were unimpeded.<sup>32</sup> Various reasons are offered for this flexibility, however, if a European crisis developed gradually enough to permit full reinforcement, the West, with its larger armies, could negate the immediate mobilization advantage of the Warsaw Pact nations. As the majority of NATO's reserve troops are stationed outside Europe, time would become the dominant factor in mobilization of this type. In total numbers, NATO has approximately 3,374,000 troops (including France-3,702,000) while

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<sup>31</sup> These are the two divisions stationed in Germany. There are three more in France.

<sup>32</sup> London Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1970-1971 (London, 1970), pp. 92-93.



the Warsaw Pact forces number 2,837,000.<sup>33</sup>

### Equipment

In a comparison of equipment, one point if readily apparent: the Warsaw Pact forces are armed almost exclusively with Soviet, or Soviet designed material. This standardization affords them the flexibility and simplicity of movement and training that the West does not have. Because of the various different models of equipment used by the NATO forces, considerable duplication of effort is experienced.

Noticeable differences result when numbers of weapons are compared. Perhaps the most significant is the relative tank strengths.

Category	No./Cent. Europe			So. Europe		
	NATO	W.P.	(USSR's)	NATO	W.P.	(USSR's)
Main battle tanks available in peacetime	5500	14,000	(8,000)	2100	5000	(1400)

The East's superiority, however, is somewhat offset by the more modern weapons NATO has available, both in tanks and ground anti-tank weapons. The comparison also reflects the essentially defensive role that NATO affirms and adheres to. In conventional artillery, both blocs are approximately equal in strength, however, NATO is likely to have slightly superior fire-power. In addition to the logistic ability of sustaining higher rates of fire, this can be attributed to the greater accuracy, modernness, and lethality of its weapons.

### Aircraft

To enable ground troops to remain effective both day and night, a considerable degree of air support must be available. This air cover is

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. 93.



provided by a combination of warning and communication systems, surface-to-air weapons, and tactical aircraft. Although numbers of aircraft indicate that NATO is markedly inferior, NATO aircraft have a greater average capability as they are more often multipurpose rather than mission-limited.

Category	No./Cent. Europe			So. Europe		
	NATO	W.P.	(USSR's)	NATO	W.P.	(USSR's)
<b>Tactical aircraft in operational service</b>						
-light bombers	16	240	(200)	--	30	(30)
-interceptors	350	2000	(900)	250	850	(450)
-fighter/attack	1400	1300	(1000)	600	200	(50)
-reconnaissance	400	400	(300)	100	100	(40)

It is difficult to determine the extent to which the greater performance and versatility of the NATO aircraft would offset the greater numbers of the Warsaw Pact. It is evident, however, that a direct comparison of the two air arms in terms solely of numbers may be misleading and could underestimate NATO's true capability. Although the East maintains a numerical superiority of aircraft in Europe, the NATO inventory world-wide is far greater than that of the Warsaw Pact. As with numbers of ground forces, NATO has greater total reinforcement capabilities. Considering all of these variables, a comparison in finite terms becomes difficult. The Warsaw Pact's numerical advantage, however, remains an ever-present reminder of the quick response strength available from the East.

#### Theatre Nuclear Weapons

As an inevitable overlap occurs when discussing the differences between "tactical" and "strategic" nuclear weapons, only brief mention will be made of each. A comparison of "strategic" nuclear weapons was best quantified in The Military Balance 1970-1971.



Category (Delivery systems)	U.S.	(Warheads)	USSR
ICBM	1074		1300
IRBM/MRBM	----		700
Other land-based missiles	750		400
SLBM	1328		280
Other naval missiles	----		362
Long-range bombers	2250		420
Other aircraft	2100		2200
Approximate totals	7502		5662

These figures also take into account the multiplying factors attributable to the multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV's).

Confirmed hardened site figures are classified and unavailable, however, American ICBM's are known to be emplaced in underground silos capable of withstanding a blast of approximately 300 pounds per square inch (psi). It has been estimated that approximately 1140 of the Soviet's 1300 ICBM's are also encased in hardened underground silos. The London Institute for Strategic Studies further speculates that about 50 percent of all Soviet IRBM's and MRBM's are as well underground.<sup>34</sup>

A somewhat looser comparison is made when discussing "tactical" nuclear weapons. NATO has some 7000 "tactical" nuclear warheads, deliverable by some 2250 variable vehicles: aircraft, short-range missiles, and artillery. Soviet warheads are approximately 3500, delivered by roughly comparable aircraft and missile systems as exist in NATO. It is also significant to note that, although some of the delivery vehicles are in the hands of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact nations, the warheads are not. The most important result of this comparison is that the Soviet Union has the ability to launch a nuclear offensive on a massive scale if desired, or to match any NATO aggression with similar forces. Hence, the fear exists that once "tactical" nuclear weapons

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<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p. 90.



are employed, an immediate escalation will result in a "strategic" nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States.

### Naval Forces

The comparison of regional naval strengths poses the same type of problem that was witnessed when ground formations were discussed. As ships move between fleets, fleets move over great distances, and ships act as combined units, it is difficult and inappropriate to alienate ships numerically. The Institute for Strategic Studies did, however, compile an approximation of naval strengths. None of the figures include the French Navy which is quantitatively stronger than the Soviet Mediterranean units.

#### North Atlantic:

Category	NATO	W.P.	Remarks
Attack Carriers	8	--	
ASW Carriers	2	--	
Surface Attack (Cruisers/Destroyers)	2	5	Attack carriers have an embarked air wing of between 70-100 aircraft
ASW Destroyers/Frigates/ Escorts	188	54	
Attack Submarines			
Nuclear	27	12	
Conventional	63	100	

#### Baltic:

Category	NATO	W.P.	Remarks
Surface Attack	4	6	
ASW Destroyers/Frigates/ Escorts	16	44	
Motor Torpedo/Gunboats	56	96	Warsaw Pact boats are generally SSM armed
Attack Submarines			
Nuclear	--	--	
Conventional			
Long/Medium range	--	51	
Short range	15	15	



## Mediterranean/Black Sea:

Category	NATO	Warsaw Pact (Bl. Sea)	Typical strength of Med. squad.
Attack Carriers	2	--	----
ASW Carriers	2	2	1-2
Surface Attack	--	5	2-3
ASW Destroyers/Frigates/ Escorts	66	57	5-9
Motor Torpedo/Gunboats	7	31	--
Attack Submarines			
Nuclear	1	3	1-2
Conventional			
Long/Medium range	35	34	6-10
Short range	--	10	----

The comparisons show that the NATO/US Navy is predominantly a carrier-strike force relying heavily upon the flexibility of an embarked air wing. The Soviet Union, by contrast, relies largely upon land-based aircraft and ship-borne air defense missiles. The lack of carrier-borne aircraft would no doubt limit the Warsaw Pact forces effective radius of action should a conflict occur.

To counter the NATO carrier-strike force dominance, the Soviet Union relies heavily upon its submarine fleet. To replace the older conventional diesel-powered submarines, a major effort toward the construction of nuclear-powered vessels was begun several years ago. Soviet construction however, has not limited itself to submarines--portions of the present Soviet fleet have been built in the last few years. Primary emphasis, other than on nuclear submarines, has been on the "Kresta" class cruiser, the "Kashin" class destroyer, and the "Osa" class fast patrol boat. The following table illustrates the Soviet changes that have occurred from 1968 to 1971 with regard to certain surface vessels.



Vessel		Year (Quantity)
	1968	1971
Cruiser		
ASW Helicopter carrier	--	2
Kresta class	1	5
Destroyer		
Kanin class	--	2
Kashin class	9	15
Ocean escort/Mine sweeper	510	540
Patrol Boats		
Osa class	50	100

It is apparent then, that an assessment and comparison of an overall military balance is difficult. Differing roles in peacetime and wartime must be accounted for, deployment areas and schedules become important, and perhaps more significant, the nature and duration of any conflict is paramount to any comparison. If a conflict were prolonged, NATO air/ground force superiority would be important; as would Soviet submarine strength. If it were short, Warsaw Pact air/ground forces may dominate the land war while NATO's carrier-based air wing would function as the dominant naval strength. In short, as environmental factors are unpredictable, any analysis of this nature must remain flexible in both quantitative and qualitative assessments.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>35</sup>All facts and figures were obtained from:

London Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1969-1970 (London, 1969), pp. 62-63.

, The Military Balance 1970-1971 (London, 1970), pp. 90-91.



INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES  
OF A U.S. UNILATERAL TROOP REDUCTION

In April 1970, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt met with various political organizations during a brief visit to the United States. In light of the political unrest for withdrawal of portions of the US troops from Western Europe, one of his primary objectives in speaking with them was to obtain reassurance that the United States would continue to honor its NATO commitment. At the White House on April 10, Chancellor Brandt alluded to the necessity for the United States military presence in Europe as a requirement for international peace and tranquility. On April 12, he was a guest on "Meet the Press." In response to the question why the American commitment to the defense of Europe must be expressed in the present number of troops, he said:

There are two strong arguments which I want to present ...  
① One is that this is not only a military problem. It is a political and psychological problem as well. In at least parts of Europe, a major withdrawal of American troops, unilaterally from Europe, would be regarded as a step towards, well, more or less, Soviet hegemony, as far as Europe is concerned. My other argument is this: there ② may be a chance during the next few years to come, to enter into serious negotiations on mutual balanced force reductions. At least we should be prepared for it. But I think an effective alliance with an important American presence in Europe is one of the preconditions of reasonable talks on mutual reductions of forces in Europe, especially in Central Europe.<sup>36</sup>

On April 20, within a week of Chancellor Brandt's State visit to Washington, Senator Mansfield addressed the United States Senate on the

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<sup>36</sup> U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sixteenth Meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly, Report of the United States Delegation to the Sixteenth Meeting of Parliaments from the North Atlantic Assembly Countries Held at the Hague, November 6 through November 11, 1970, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., August, 1971 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 86.



issue of US troop commitments in Western Europe. He stressed that, contrary to the belief apparently held in the United States and Europe, his amendment did not demand that the United States quit Europe, rather, it implied:

... a substantial reduction of United States forces permanently stationed in Europe can be made without adversely affecting either our (US) resolve or ability<sup>37</sup> to meet our commitment under the North Atlantic Treaty.

He further emphasized that present conditions in Europe, as well as in the United States, made possible this substantial reduction in the American military presence in Europe.

Numerous significant developments have occurred in international relations since Senator Mansfield initially introduced his resolution for US troop reductions. Some have strengthened his argument, others have not. They have, however, compelled world leaders to reassess their foreign policy strategies.

Perhaps one of the most important events in European politics was the signing of the Soviet-West German Treaty in Moscow on August 12, 1970. Even if it had not been ratified, its initial signature alone would have made it an historic event. The overture made to East Germany and Poland from the Federal Republic of Germany; the satisfactory agreement on Berlin reached by the Big Four Powers: France, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union; the October 1970 State visit of French President Pompidou to the Soviet Union; and the interest throughout Europe concerning a European Security Conference have been other significant East-West developments.<sup>38</sup> As their importance can not be overstressed, each shall be briefly discussed.

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 15.



The Soviet-West German Treaty has been proclaimed by some as the commencement of a new era of peaceful relations in Europe.<sup>39</sup> It has, at the same time, given rise to serious doubts. If the ratification of the treaty on 17 May 1972, accomplishes an easement in cultural, economic and political tensions between the East and the West, Chancellor Brandt's "Ostpolitik" will have been successful. If, however, it permanently cements the division of the two Germanies and weakens NATO's political unity, the Soviet Union will have made a positive gain in their ideological quest for dominance. Only future developments in the international political arena will clarify whether the treaty will be suitable to attain the reduction of the long-felt tensions.

On March 19, 1970, for the first time since 1945, the Heads of Government of the two parts of Germany formally met at a conference.<sup>40</sup> Both participants had their respective objectives. West German Chancellor Brandt was desirous of achieving closer and more normal relations between the two Germanies, a reduction in human hardships caused by the physical division of the Germanies, and balanced force and armament reductions between the East and the West. East German Chairman Stoph sought formal diplomatic recognition for the German Democratic Republic. As a result of this first meeting, there was considerable speculation concerning the possibilities of reducing inter-German tension. At their second meeting (21 May, 1970) however, Chancellor Brandt's refusal to acknowledge formal diplomatic recognition for East Germany caused a stalemate in negotiations. Although tension still exists between the two Germanies, some relaxation has occurred as a result of these talks.

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid., pp. 43-45. Portions of this August 12, 1970, treaty are duplicated so that the intent of the agreement can be clearly seen. See Appendix II.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., p. 18. See Appendix III.



Several rounds of negotiations have also been held between the Federal Republic of Germany and Poland. Although no definite results have been experienced, these negotiations clearly demonstrate the desire of the Federal Republic of Germany to seek solutions to ideological problems through peaceful means.

Diplomatic exchanges concerning Berlin have also occurred since Senator Mansfield first introduced his resolution. On March 26, 1970, the first talks in a decade were opened between the Big Four Powers: France, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The main points discussed in March, and later again in April of 1970, concerned access routes to West Berlin and the easement of humanitarian hardships suffered by all Germans.<sup>41</sup> In September of 1971, an accord over Berlin was reached which further reduced tensions between the two Germanies.

Another significant development in East-West relations occurred in October of 1970: French President Pompidou made a formal State visit to the Soviet Union. His visit, concluding with a Franco-Soviet Declaration of Cooperation, was of considerable importance as it marked, on France's behalf, an approach to detente which was analogous to that of the Federal Republic of Germany. It also continued the process of Franco-Soviet rapprochement which had been initiated by former President deGaulle. Although it would have appeared that President Pompidou's visit to Moscow was a sign of submission on the part of the West, he stressed with great emphasis that closer relations between France and the Soviet Union were based entirely upon France's membership in the North Atlantic Alliance and its belief in the need for greater European unity and assertion in world affairs.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid., pp. 21-22.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., pp. 23-25.



A significant part of the Franco-Soviet Declaration was the interest exhibited by both participants in the establishment of a European Security Conference.<sup>43</sup> Western Europeans, while interested in such a conference, have reservations concerning its timing, content and objectives. According to the report of a special study mission on Europe by Representative Farbstein, under no circumstances would the Western Europeans tolerate a conference unless all of the NATO signatories were participants, including the United States and Canada.<sup>44</sup> Although the original Soviet proposal made no mention of either of the North Atlantic powers, Representative Farbstein felt there were no objections from the East to a US-Canadian participation. Another apparent problem area, and perhaps equally significant to the formation of a conference, is the lack of agreement on specific proposals to resolve. The West appears interested in the status and access of Berlin while the East is more concerned about the formal diplomatic recognition of East Germany. In his book Detente Diplomacy, Timothy Stanley feels that the primary reason the Soviets are extolling the virtues of a unified European conference is to cover its 1968 Czechoslovakian invasion.<sup>45</sup> By advocating a conference, perhaps the West will overlook the Soviet's continued use of force in achieving its political objectives. Even if the actuality of its formation is unlikely, the conference has become a symbol of detente between the East and the West.

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<sup>43</sup> See Appendix IV.

<sup>44</sup> U.S., Congress, Farbstein, op. cit., p. 17.

<sup>45</sup> Timothy W. Stanley and Darnell M. Whitt, Detente Diplomacy: United States and European Security in the 1970's (New York: Dunellen Publishing Co., Inc., 1970), pp. 1-2.



Several explanations also exist why the Soviet Union appears to be promoting a detente with the West. One is undoubtedly the difficulty it is experiencing on its Eastern front. The increase in the number of Soviet divisions in the districts bordering on China and Outer Mongolia since 1965 has diverted considerable manpower and equipment which would likely have been used to support and strengthen their Western forces. As conditions in Western Europe have remained relatively stable for a considerable period of time, perhaps foremost on Moscow's agenda is its preoccupation with Communist China. West German Chancellor Brandt capsulized this attitude:

The Soviets may say that they are agreeing on Berlin for a detente in Europe and not for any other reason, but, you must remember, they've got China on their doorstep; they have a lot to gain by putting their European house in order.<sup>46</sup>

Another reason for the Soviet Union to seek a rapprochement is to obtain economic and technological aid from the West. The Soviet Union and their Warsaw Pact allies apparently want Western technology and machinery badly enough to assure peace in Europe. In addition, growing consumer demands and agricultural deficiencies within the Soviet Union are undoubtedly having some affect on the Soviet society. A third, and perhaps more pessimistic reason for the apparent Soviet rapprochement is, that with an effective detente, the Soviet Union has a means of extending its power and influence throughout Europe, hence, the world. Still another is the uncertainty that exists in Moscow today: the Soviet general staff simply can not tell the Kremlin what would happen if they (USSR) used force against the West.<sup>47</sup> Rather than risk unnecessary confrontation for what can be achieved peacefully, the Soviet Union appears to be seeking a relaxation in the current tensions.

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<sup>46</sup>"Berlin Crisis," Newsweek, September 6, 1971, p. 29.

<sup>47</sup>"NATO: An Alliance in Search of a Future," Readers Digest, April, 1969, p. 168.



One thought would be well to reiterate at this time. Although the Russian Eastern security is undoubtedly a problem and would be an impetus in seeking stability in the West, the issues in Western Europe are too closely aligned with historical fears, ideology and internal Soviet insecurities and power struggles to permit a complete relaxation and accommodation.<sup>48</sup> In an article written for NATO's Fifteen Nations, Major General (Dr.) M.W.J.M. Brockmeijer offered a cautionary comment.

The Soviet interpretation of "detente" means nothing else than luring the Western European nations into a position in which only Soviet interests are served ... Soviet peace only means integration into the Soviet commonwealth, wherein there is no place for nation-states ... the Brezhnev Doctrine is the writing on the wall, a serious warning for everyone who wants freedom for himself and his people.<sup>49</sup>

With that "optimistic" outlook, let us turn to the possible consequences of an American unilateral troop reduction from Western Europe.

From the end of World War II and until the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the only credible deterrent which kept the Soviet Union from creeping further into Western Europe was the presence of American forces. Once NATO was established, these forces became an integral part in the total military superstructure that has since assumed and accomplished that role. Many Western Europeans feel, however, that, although NATO itself is a functional organization, the presence of US forces in Europe today still remains the only credible deterrent.<sup>50</sup>

Since 1945, the Soviet Union has been expanding its strategic nuclear capability. In fact, where the United States once had a commanding

<sup>48</sup> Stanley and Whitt, op. cit., p. 8.

<sup>49</sup> Major General (Dr.) M.W.J.M. Brockmeijer, "NATO and the Brezhnev Doctrine," NATO's Fifteen Nations, Vol. 16, No. 3 (June-July, 1971) p. 24.

<sup>50</sup> U.S., Congress, Farbstein, op. cit., p. 10.



superiority, the Soviet Union has now nearly equaled in total numbers the strategic nuclear weapons available to the US. Consequently, the relationship between the conventional military forces of the NATO alliance and the Warsaw Pact assumes additional significance. As early as 1968, General Wheeler stated:

... it is clearer today than ever before that we (US) need the North Atlantic Alliance and it needs us...one inescapable requirement is to keep the Alliance cohesive and militarily strong, despite non-military pressures that argue for increased and accelerated troop reductions.<sup>51</sup>

Western Europeans are of the opinion that any diminution of NATO's conventional capability, and especially a US reduction, would have the effect of upsetting the precarious balance-of-power that now exists.<sup>52</sup> If this is correct, any military reduction of the US commitment to NATO would have serious economic, military, political and psychological consequences in both Europe and the United States.

At this point in the development, it is felt an additional statement need be made concerning the scope of the analysis. As the study is designed to analyze the possible repercussions to Europe and the United States of a substantial US unilateral troop reduction from Western Europe, no specific mention will be made of the Southern flank of NATO and the myriad of problems that are presented by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact's presence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean theatre. It is none-the-less acknowledged that any consequences experienced in Western Europe would as well likely be experienced to some degree in other

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<sup>51</sup> General Earle Wheeler, USA, "Strategic Tasks Facing the U.S.," Armed Forces Staff College, Nuclear Warfare (Unclassified) (Norfolk: No. 611ASC), August 31, 1968, pp. xiii-1.

<sup>52</sup> U.S., Congress, Farbstein, op. cit., p. 10.



geographical areas of the European continent. For ease of discussion therefore, only Western Europe shall be referred to.

## EUROPE

### Economic Consequences

Ever since the United States stationed military forces in Western Europe, the European nations have been virtually unhampered in their post-war rebuilding and economic expansion activities. West Germany, France, Great Britain and other ravaged nations were able to completely rebuild and replenish themselves in a very few years. They were able to accomplish these feats only as a result of the stability assured by the presence of American troops. In his special report to Congress, Representative Farbstein specifically pointed out one of the more significant of these accomplishments--the Common Market. As one European leader told Representative Farbstein in an interview:

The United States has been the catalyst pushing Europe toward unity, and has been the cement which held it together. Without the deep US involvement in NATO, Europe would have gone off in many different directions at once.<sup>53</sup>

With the Common Market recently expanding its membership to include nearly all Western European nations, it is not felt that any drastic economic consequences would be experienced were a US troop reduction to occur.<sup>54</sup> If the major powers: France, Great Britain and West Germany, were not united or bonded economically in some manner, however, a possible breakdown in economic unity might result. Each nation might feel the need to assert itself in some manner so as not to be alienated economically from each other

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>54</sup> Economic trade considerations between the United States and Western Europe will be discussed later.



and the rest of the world. It is hoped that the existence of the Common Market eliminates this possibility.

One positive reaction to a US force reduction might occur. In order to fill the manpower void created by a US troop withdrawal, greater numbers of individuals could be conscripted into the military services throughout Europe. This might fulfill not only the NATO defense requirements, but as well, reduce the current unemployment problems facing Western Europe. According to the West German Federal Labor Office, unemployment figures rose from 268,200 in January 1971, to 375,600 in January 1972.<sup>55</sup> Although additional armed service members would not entirely alleviate this dilemma, some strain on the German economy might be relieved. The same theory can be applied to all Western European nations, not just West Germany. As the concern in the United States is to reduce the military component, an opposite effect might occur in the US. This will be mentioned in greater detail when economic consequences to the United States are discussed.

A considerable amount of discussion and speculation has taken place over the subjects of burden-sharing and balance-of-payments deficits. An interesting attitude toward these topics was observed by Representative Farbstein on his tour of Europe. Europeans argued that, as the US insisted on controlling the nuclear weapons allocated for NATO's useage, it should be willing to pay for that right. If the Europeans were given more leeway in nuclear matters, they would not be so reluctant to absorb portions of the financial costs for their maintenance.<sup>56</sup> Timothy Stanley's analogy to US taxes is in apparent agreement with this attitude.

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<sup>55</sup>"West German Posts Unemployment Surge," Wall Street Journal, February 9, 1972, p. 6.

<sup>56</sup>U.S., Congress, Farbstein, op. cit., p. 10.



American seem willing to accept progressive taxation at home--in other words, the principle that the wealthier pay higher rates. They apparently reject, however, the notion that this principle is equitable internationally, that is, for a country with 2 1/2 times the average per capita income of the Alliance to pay at least twice as high a "defense" tax--although this is just about the case in some American personal income tax brackets.<sup>57</sup>

The obvious rebuttal to this argument is, of course, that America is not the only recipient of this nuclear protection. The Europeans benefit as much, and perhaps more than the United States, from this nuclear umbrella and should accordingly share in alleviating its cost. Instead, the Europeans have preferred to enjoy their prosperity and national independence rather than pay the price of political union.<sup>58</sup> As Senator Mansfield so succinctly stated:

When the chips are down, it appears that a number of our (US) European allies are more interested in their domestic concerns than they are in the international scene which they expect us to improve.<sup>59</sup>

Several arguments have been offered justifying a US troop reduction. Initially the aim of the United States was to encourage the formation of a strong and unified Europe which would act as an equal partner with the US in a shared defense of a conceivable threat. Perhaps it is time to reevaluate that goal in light of the increased NATO firepower and mobility. The growing unity and strength of Western Europe may now be at such a level that the Europeans themselves can assume greater responsibilities for their own defense. Unfortunately, experience has shown that unless they are forced to pay for their defense, the Europeans are likely not to be overly concerned about it. The most credible way of forcing them to accept their

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<sup>57</sup> Stanley and Whitt, op. cit., p. 59.

<sup>58</sup> U.S., Congress, Congressional Record, "Meat-Ax Mike," Editorial James Reston, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), CXVII, No. 70, p. S6960.

<sup>59</sup> U.S., Congress, Congressional Record, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), CXVII, No. 68, p. S6680.



responsibilities may be to trim the American forces throughout NATO and its military structure.<sup>60</sup> In an article entitled "We're Paying Too Much for NATO," Senator Percy stipulated two alternatives to the solution: unilateral troop reductions, or increased burden-sharing.<sup>61</sup> He felt that, as Europe was no longer a rubble-strewn continent, it could bear a much larger defense burden. If the Europeans refused to accept this new responsibility, reductions in US troop levels would become inevitable.

Senator Mansfield agreed entirely when he stated:

...there is no serious reason why the major nations of Western Europe can not take over from the US the primary responsibility for their own defense, especially conventional defense. By doggedly insisting that the Europeans should rely primarily on us (US) instead of each other, we are subsidizing Europe's disunity and adventurism.<sup>62</sup>

One solution to this matter would be for the US to reduce the payment deficits largely incurred from activities within Europe. This was discussed rather thoroughly earlier when analyzing the costs and finances of maintaining US troops in Europe. If it is in the interest of Europeans to maintain the additional troops the US is apparently considering reducing, they should assist in carrying the additional share of the payments necessary to maintain these troops. Although the European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP) began in 1970, a great deal remains to be done. Positive steps have been taken by various NATO allies to absorb this possible impending loss of US forces, but to date, they have been unable to reduce the tension that exists for a US troop reduction. European nations have pledged

<sup>60</sup> James Doyle, "Retreat in the Senate," Progressive (July, 1971), p. 27.

<sup>61</sup> U.S., Congress, Congressional Record, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), CXVII, No. 73, p. S6993.

<sup>62</sup> Davis P. Calleo, "Mansfield Amendment: Yes," New York Times, May 19, 1971.



to increase their defense spendings by \$100 million in the next five years. Although this demonstrates an effort on Europe's part, this amount unfortunately only equals one ninth of the annual US balance-of-payments deficits incurred by maintaining the present level of US troops in Europe.<sup>63</sup> NATO's "Euro-group," composed of the defense ministers of the West European members, proposed that they contribute \$250 to \$300 million toward a reduction of US defense expenditures in Europe. President Nixon, however, made it clear to NATO leaders that the US prefers increases in the levels of forces and arms of European members rather than cash contributions toward the support of the 300,000 US personnel stationed in Europe.<sup>64</sup>

In short, with increased effort being displayed by the United States' European allies, the effect of a troop reduction might be to stimulate a certain degree of European "nationalism." Greater efforts might be made toward covering the excessive defense expenditures incurred by the US and a more equitable troop commitment arrangement might be effected. Under these circumstances, the European nations who have never completely satisfied their NATO military requirements might also be compelled into finally achieving the level of military commitment initially requested of them by the NATO charter.<sup>65</sup>

#### Military Consequences

As NATO is primarily a defensive military alliance, an analysis of speculative military consequences is somewhat more adaptable than economic

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<sup>63</sup> U.S., Congress, Congressional Record, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), CXVII, No. 68, p. S6679.

<sup>64</sup> "Nixon is Reported to Prefer NATO Troops to Subsidies," New York Times, October 7, 1970.

<sup>65</sup> S.L.R. Harrison, "America's 1969 Option," NATO's Fifteen Nations, Vol. 14, No. 2 (April-May, 1969), p. 14.



repercussions. In order to properly perceive the military perspective, it is necessary to recall the discussion of the military balance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces.

The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations together comprise a military force exceeding any previously witnessed in history. It also exceeds any requirements needed for purely defensive purposes.<sup>66</sup> For this reason, the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat has not diminished, and in fact, in some ways, increased. NATO forces still face a potential enemy with more manpower and armored vehicles than it possesses, and as many tactical aircraft and theatre nuclear weapons. While the US has modernized its inventory of conventional warfare weapons, the Soviets have continually expanded theirs in quantity.<sup>67</sup> In addition to the quantitative improvements in the Soviet Union's military capability, their forces are continually being trained and mobilized. Eugene V. Rostow, former Under-secretary of State for President Johnson, was adamant in his attack on the current theory that the Cold War is over.

It is fashionable in Western Europe and the United States to believe that the Cold War is over, that detente prevails, and that the Soviet Union is pursuing a policy of collaboration with the West. I have been unable to find any evidence to support such a view. True, the NATO governments no longer engage in vituperation with or about the Soviet Union. But Soviet propaganda, at home and abroad, is still written in vitriol. We have simply stopped listening. Soviet energy presses outwards, patient and ingenious, flowing around obstacles, taking advantage of every opening. It can be stopped only by the calm deployment of unacceptable risks.<sup>68</sup>

Until the Soviet Union demonstrates a clear desire for peace and a willingness to reduce its military strength, the United States would

<sup>66</sup> General Goodpaster, op. cit., p. 59.

<sup>67</sup> U.S., Congress, Congressional Record, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), CXVII, No. 74, p. S7391.

<sup>68</sup> Hearst, op. cit.



directly and adversely affect the credibility of the NATO military forces by implementing a reduction at this time. As there are no signs on Moscow's side of the Iron Curtain that a downgrading of defense posture is being effected, the United States would be foolish to slacken the defensive structure and stature of the NATO allies.<sup>69</sup> With a reduced Western defense posture, the European balance-of-power would be upset in favor of the Soviet bloc. Its affect on the entire security system in Europe might be considerable.

A reduction of US forces from NATO might additionally offer temptations to a nation that has avowed a policy of domination.<sup>70</sup> In a testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, General Goodpaster implied that there were clear indications of a long-range Soviet objective of achieving a strategic and tactical power advantage in the European theatre.<sup>71</sup> One rather effortless way for the Soviet Union to achieve this tactical advantage would be to convince Western Europe that a threat no longer existed and the American presence was no longer required. Once the United States became physically isolated from the European continent, it would be a matter of time before Soviet dominance would be experienced throughout much of Europe.

It might be well to recall Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). As a result of these two dramatic experiences, the fear still prevails that, if afforded an opportunity, the Soviet Union will continue to employ military pressures as a means of accomplishing political goals. A

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<sup>69</sup> General Goodpaster, op. cit., p. 60.

<sup>70</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization Information Service, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Paris, 1962), p. 59.

<sup>71</sup> U.S., Congress, Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, Part III, p. 516.



unilateral American reduction might just create that environment. As Senator Brock so adequately stated:

It is true that we are in a different age than Roosevelt, Truman or Eisenhower, but it would be difficult to sell that to the Hungarians and the Czechoslovakians.<sup>72</sup>

NATO's strategy has, on occasion, been compared to a "sword" and a "shield."<sup>73</sup> Both are necessary and complimentary--one is of little value without the other. Were the NATO forces significantly reduced, the shield's value would be diminished and the concept of the forward defense turned into shambles. If this forward line of defense of the NATO nations were weakened, it would be a relatively simple matter for the Russians, or their allies, to advance across that line.

#### Political Consequences

Along with the economic and military consequences, political repercussions are at best speculative. Unlike the economic unity afforded by the Common Market, Europe is not politically unified. Numerous negotiations that are currently being conducted might possibly affect the political future of several nations, the North Atlantic Alliance, and perhaps the world, but, as long as Western Europe remains a loose political conglomerate, NATO must not be weakened. Only the Soviet Union stands to win from a fragmented Europe.

Were an American unilateral withdrawal to occur, additional political danger to the West would result from the military superiority of the Warsaw Pact nations. This superiority might be used to exert political pressures on the West, thereby inducing them to redefine their policies, not

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<sup>72</sup>U.S., Congress, Congressional Record, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), CXVII, No. 74, p. S7391.

<sup>73</sup>Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward A Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 120-123.



necessarily in their own interests, but primarily in those of the USSR.<sup>74</sup>

As the present is an era of negotiation rather than confrontation, any policy aimed at reducing tension must be conducted in an atmosphere of security and stability. As has been demonstrated in recent months with regard to the US withdrawal of military forces from Vietnam, the ability to negotiate successfully is not strengthened by unilateral troop reductions by one of the negotiating parties. Why would the Soviet negotiate for troop reductions if they knew for certain that American troops would be withdrawn regardless of the outcome of the negotiations? As the most beneficial negotiation platform appears to be one of strength, any unilateral reduction of American forces would weaken the NATO position on balanced force reductions.

To engage in a unilateral process of withdrawal is not a process of negotiation, it is a process by which the prospects of successful negotiations are eliminated.<sup>75</sup>

John Morse, an American participant at the Wehrunde Conference on NATO held in Munich in February 1971, capsulized the damage that might result from an American unilateral withdrawal of forces.

Defense and detente are the keystones of an alliance, the US decision to unilaterally withdraw, without the remaining allies concurrence, defeats these objectives. It reduces the chances of exploring ways to settle a just peace through negotiation.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Christopher Bertram, "European Security: Continuity and Change," World Today (March, 1971), p. 116.

<sup>75</sup> U.S., Congress, Congressional Record, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), CXVII, No. 74, p. S7391.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, p. S7392.



Other significant negotiation efforts which might possibly be destroyed by a US unilateral reduction are those of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt. As his "Ostpolitik" is psychologically fragile, any action which might affect the existing Western European balance of military power could have a devastating effect upon it and its current successes.

#### Psychological Consequences

Several psychological consequences might occur as a result of an American reduction. Perhaps one of the more severe might be the belief that the United States would not honor its treaty commitments. A troop withdrawal might indicate to the world that the US resolve to come to the assistance of her allies was questionable. America's post-Vietnam reassessment seems likely to devalue, for some time to come, the political viability of unilateral American action in a peacekeeping role.<sup>77</sup> President Nixon has apparently captured this mood with his low-profile approach to US foreign policy. Some West Europeans fear that the US is occupied with Vietnam and domestic difficulties and may one day cease to serve as an effective protector of Europe.<sup>78</sup> Others seriously question the United States' leadership in the alliance.<sup>79</sup> Averill Harriman, the American who chaired the 1951 joint US-Britain-France committee which established each nation's potential contributions to NATO, is quoted as having said:

It never occurred to me that we would continue to keep such large forces for as long as we have. The plan was for the European nations to build their own forces as their economies

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<sup>77</sup> Timothy W. Stanley, NATO in Transition: The Future of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1965), p. 9.

<sup>78</sup> "Europe: A Time of Testing for the Power Blocs," Time, 94:28 (December 12, 1969).

<sup>79</sup> Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., "Superpower-Allies Relationships: The U.S.-NATO-Europe," Arms Control and National Security: An International Journal (New York: The Hudson Institute, 1969), p. 9.



recovered, stimulated by the Marshall Plan. Unfortunately, we have substantially maintained our force levels--this has become such a rigid tradition that any reduction on our side gives credence to the feeling among Europeans that we are turning our backs to them and retreating into isolationism.<sup>80</sup>

As none of the Western European nations have access to, or control of, the US tactical nuclear weapons, they must rely entirely on their belief that the United States would employ them if the need arose. Because of the strategic balance existing between the Soviet and US long-range missile capabilities, there is the fear that the US would not be willing to use tactical nuclear weapons in defense of Europe.<sup>81</sup>

Another fear that might arise is that the US would be reluctant to physically join a European conflict once the number of US troops maintained in Europe were reduced. When he encountered arguments similar to this on his fact-finding mission to Europe, Representative Farbstein pointed out that the United States would not sacrifice 50,000 Americans any more than it would 300,000. If the Soviet bloc initiated hostilities against Western Europe, the United States would respond with whatever force was necessary to repel such an attack. He further stated that the real deterrent to war in Europe was the US nuclear capability and that this would be present regardless of how many troops the US maintained in Europe. It was therefore the presence of US troops rather than the numbers involved that were important to the credibility of the NATO military structure.<sup>82</sup> Russia and the US NATO allies know that as long as there is a token amount of American troops

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<sup>80</sup> James Doyle, op. cit., p. 27.

<sup>81</sup> U.S., Congress, Farbstein, op. cit., p. 10.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.



guaranteeing US involvement in any assault, the nuclear formula takes force.<sup>83</sup>

As discussed earlier in political consequences, an indication now to the Soviet Union that reductions in NATO forces would come without reciprocal reductions in Warsaw Pact forces might increase their reluctance to reduce by negotiation. They may also question US sincerity to honor its commitments. A subsequent "test" of the West's credibility may result--perhaps once again restricting access to Berlin. A "symbolic" American force--mainly flags instead of bodies--would not carry much credibility in the eyes of the Russians.<sup>84</sup> In any instance, the US can not afford to be seriously challenged on matters of this nature. As only they have control of the tactical nuclear weapons dispersed throughout Western Europe, they must remain credible.

It is hoped that we are all fearful of, and desirous of avoiding a nuclear war at any cost and under any circumstances. Were the level of conventional forces sufficiently reduced, however, a point might be reached where the nuclear threshold was so low that any conventional conflict would erupt into a devastating nuclear holocaust. Was this not the major reason in 1967 for adopting the still existent NATO strategy of "flexible response?" As a result of the suggestions that the United States reduce the size of her military commitment to Europe, many Europeans are fearful that this reduction might signal a return to the former NATO strategy of "massive retaliation."<sup>85</sup> It would then seem that the present strategy is viable only as

<sup>83</sup> U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), CXVII, No. 74, p. S7387.

<sup>84</sup> Dr. Theo Sommer, "Detente and Security: The Options," NATO's Fifteen Nations, Vol. 15, No. 6 (December, 1970-January, 1971), p. 82.

<sup>85</sup> U.S., Congress, Farbstein, op. cit., p. 12.



long as a sizeable NATO military force is present within Western Europe.

In the final analysis, it appears that the ultimate safety of Western Europe, and indirectly the US itself, is guaranteed only by the effectiveness and credibility of the US nuclear deterrent. Were a troop reduction to occur, the willingness to employ nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe might become suspect.

Combining the previously mentioned economic, military, political and psychological effects of an American troop reduction, a pronounced European readjustment might occur. Such an action by US administrators might lead Western Europe into its first major reorientation since the end of World War II. Europe might move toward neutralism in the East-West struggle. It may encourage unilateral policies with independent, non-aligned nations, a move, without question, of concern to US security interests. Another European reaction might be panicked efforts to augment their existing military capabilities, thereby creating an additional source of tension between the East and the West. What affect would a rearming of Western Europe have upon the Soviet Union? As Western Europe does not have a credible nuclear deterrent, an attempt might be made to develop and acquire an independent nuclear defense of its own. Once this had occurred, there would be the chance that both sides, without any real intention on either part, might find themselves in the midst of a nuclear war.

Additionally, the Alliance may entirely crumble and the whole fabric of stability in Europe be destroyed. As President Nixon has obviously conducted secret talks with US adversaries,<sup>86</sup> Europeans may feel that the US

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<sup>86</sup> Reference is made here to the 1971 secret US-North Vietnamese talks conducted in Paris between Dr. Kissinger and representatives of the North Vietnamese government.



had either made some sort of hegemonic deal with the Russians or had devalued its interest in Europe.<sup>87</sup> In either case, the Alliance might unravel entirely and the Western Europeans might then seek separate accommodations with whomever is available. Another possibility exists: the Europeans, sensing that the Soviet threat has dissipated, might reduce their military defense posture to coincide with the American reduction.<sup>88</sup> The outcome of an action such as this would be quite easily discernable--an utterly defenseless Western Europe which the United States would then feel morally committed to defend. For these reasons it is felt that any advancement to reduce NATO's conventional forces should be resisted until definite proof has been displayed by the East that a rapprochement is possible and likely.

#### UNITED STATES

##### Economic Consequences

As was illustrated in the earlier discussion of US Defense Expenditures for Western Europe, negligible US budgetary reductions would appear unless the troops returned from Europe were deactivated or those ear-marked for NATO's use were either reassigned or themselves demobilized. Although a redeployment of troops from Europe would ease the US balance-of-payments deficit, additional US domestic costs would be incurred from maintaining them in a quickly deployable status. Senator Mansfield made one of the few positive statements concerning budgetary savings when he addressed Congress on May 11, 1971. He related that by passing and implementing his resolution, financial savings to the American taxpayer may be as high as \$1 1/2

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<sup>87</sup> Stanley and Whitt, op. cit., p. 61.

<sup>88</sup> Dr. Sommer, op. cit., p. 82.



<sup>89</sup> billion. In estimating that amount, he was referring to the reduction and deactivation of one half of the US troop commitment to NATO.

Not only have specific financial savings not been delineated in troop reduction discussions, but as well, no mention has been made of the origin of the troops which will be withdrawn. Would they consist of artillery forces, supply forces, infantry forces, naval forces? Although Senator Mansfield's proposal would yield positive financial savings, he also only referred to general troop "cuts." In a study of a selective process of troop reductions, it was estimated that, if 50,000 support troops stationed in Europe and one Army division of reserves stationed in the US were deactivated, savings would exceed \$900 million per year.<sup>90</sup> The study additionally showed that over a four year period, \$6.4 billion could be eliminated from the US defense budget. This \$6.4 billion could then be employed in solving internal US domestic problems. With a drastic troop reduction, an equally significant and realistic possibility would be a decline in defense-related spending. What effect might this have on the stability and growth of the American economy?

Another unavoidable problem is that certain industries, workers, and communities which are heavily involved in defense activities may encounter numerous readjustment problems, even if the overall workload demand is kept high. Shifting people and resources to new uses is time consuming and would create considerable hardships for the parts of the economy that might become affected. In some industries, the dependence on defense contracts is

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<sup>89</sup> U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), CXVII, No. 68, p. S6680.

<sup>90</sup> Robert S. Benson and Harold Wolman, Counterbudget: A Blueprint for Changing National Priorities 1971-1976 (New York, 1971), p. 263. HN 59.N2



remarkably high. Some geographical areas are as well highly dependent.<sup>91</sup> In 1960, representing about 9% of total US employment, more than 6 million persons were employed by the Federal government and industrial defense-related activities.<sup>92</sup> Between the fiscal years 1965 and 1967, the proportion of total public and private employment for the Department of Defense rose from 8.6% to 10.3%. One problem of these defense-related industries is that they are unevenly distributed among industries, occupations and regions. Three separate industries, representing only 4% of total US industry, accounted for almost 1/3 of all defense-generated employment. Approximately three out of every five aeronautical engineers, two out of every five airplane mechanics, and two out of every five physicists in the United States were dependent on military expenditures for their livelihood. Additionally, the percentage of defense-related jobs were much higher in several states, counties and communities than the percentage for the country as a whole.<sup>93</sup>

A reduction in the US troop commitment to Europe might then appreciably affect defense-related industries. Possible job lay-offs and redistribution

<sup>91</sup>"Economic Impacts of Disarmament," U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (January, 1962), pp. 3-4. Although these figures were compiled in 1962, one can obtain a good insight into the dependency on defense contracts. Approximately 95% of all employment on aircraft and missiles was defense oriented; 60% in ships and boat-building; and 40% in radio and communications equipment. Geographical areas are as well highly dependent: 1959 aircraft and missile production provided 82% of all employment in the Long Beach-Los Angeles area.

<sup>92</sup>"The Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament," U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Part II (March, 1962), p. 3.

<sup>93</sup>"Impact of Reduced Defense Expenditures on the American Economy," U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: 7th Annual Report to Congress (January 1, 1967-January 18, 1968), p. 40.



could result. Assuming those forces returned to the United States were deactivated, not only could these laid-off industrial laborers enter the job market, but as well, the 150,000 individuals released from the services. The effect of such a manpower surge into the labor market would likely be considerable.

By enacting the Emergency Employment Act of 1971 into law, the present Administration has initiated a public service employment program in an attempt to partially alleviate the existing unemployment problem.<sup>94</sup> This law, signed on August 9, 1971, began a two year program of establishing government subsidized jobs. The \$2.25 billion allotted by Congress (\$1 billion was allotted for the first year) was quickly absorbed by the 140,000 or so positions created. This still left nearly 5 million persons unemployed in the US. Were these additional industrial workers and servicemen to join the ranks of the unemployed, all initial improvements of the program would be negated. Additionally, any anticipated budgetary savings from the troop reduction would likely be incorporated into the increased government expenditures necessary to finance an adequate public works program. Were the government subsidized program discontinued, the seriousness of the unemployment situation would only be compounded. It seems apparent then that any troop reduction would be impractical due to the possibilities of increasing the already serious unemployment problem within the United States.

While accomplishing the same financial goal as mentioned earlier, one possible solution to easing the tension that exists over US troop reductions might be to increase the coordination and integration among the NATO allies. Since NATO is an alliance of different countries, each responsible for

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<sup>94</sup>"Public Service Jobs," The New Republic, October 2, 1971, p. 11.



equipping and supplying its armed forces, there is a considerable amount of duplication in procurement and supply techniques. As a result, excessive wastes occur and there is an inefficient utilization of money and resources. Closer cooperation and integration might possibly reduce these costs. Unfortunately, however, it is the United States who refuses to enter into arrangements that would make the US military forces in Europe dependent upon a NATO supply system. Were the US to alter its policy and allow a NATO supervised super-supply network to be established, considerable saving would undoubtedly result.<sup>95</sup> It is noted, however, that, although US defense expenditures may be reduced, these savings would not be a result of US troop reductions.

#### Military Consequences

The majority of issues concerning military consequences was previously discussed in detail (see Military Consequences - Europe). Factors felt peculiar to the United States are now covered.

With the implementation of the Nixon Doctrine and its low profile approach to US military commitments throughout the world, a noticeable effect is being witnessed within the US military services--wages are being increased and are more closely approximating those received by civilian contemporaries, living conditions are being improved, and personal liberties are being expanded. A possible reduction of US troops from Europe would fit quite nicely into President Nixon's new strategy of "realistic deterrence," however, their return would not appreciably affect the overall budgetary considerations of the Administration. The savings that would

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<sup>95</sup>U.S., Congress, Farbstein, op. cit., p. 14.



result by reducing troop levels would be absorbed by the qualitative improvements being experienced within the military.<sup>96</sup> Additionally, that potentially fearful credibility gap in the US military force commitment to Europe would still be created.

#### Political Consequences

Although it is felt that no actual political repercussions would be experienced as a result of a US troop reduction, it is significant to analyze the political pressures which are being exerted and their possible consequences.

As 1972 is a Presidential election year, President Nixon must remain aware of the possible repercussions of an angry or hostile Congress, and nation. Although the Mansfield resolution has repeatedly been defeated, President Nixon's low profile approach to foreign policy appears to be in agreement with the gathering support for what Mansfield has been advocating for several years--a reduction in American foreign military commitments. If the US is successful in its "Vietnamization" of the conflict in Southeast Asia, pressures may compel the President to initiate a similar action with regard to the defense of Europe. After all, it would seem that the Nixon Doctrine of "helping others help themselves" is more applicable to Europe. It is economically wealthier, politically more stable and considerably less volatile than Southeast Asia.

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<sup>96</sup>"Laird in His Annual Report to Congress, Asks 'Public Dialogue' on Defense Policy," Wall Street Journal, February 16, 1972. President Nixon's new defense strategy of "realistic deterrence" involves smaller, better armed active-duty forces while greater reliance is placed upon the reserves, the National Guard and allied manpower. Although reducing the overall number of US active-duty forces, President Nixon requested an increase in defense spending for fiscal 1973, up \$700 million from fiscal 1972. These costs presumably are to cover the additional equipment, training and pay being afforded the active-duty personnel.



As the Constitution specifically delineates foreign policy responsibilities to the executive branch of the government, the only direct influence Congress has upon Presidential foreign policy decisions is through the appropriations he must have in order to adequately pursue his policies. Were he not to receive the necessary appropriations, the President would be forced to alter his objectives. This might be interpreted as if the President were relinquishing to Congressional demands. The President can not allow himself to be pressured into what might appear as Congressional dictation of American foreign policy. The possibility of this misinterpretation might be the most devastating of any unilateral troop reduction consequence.

As was clearly demonstrated in the discussion of Military Consequences--Europe, once US troops were withdrawn from Europe it could be hypothesized that the credibility of the NATO conventional forces would become suspect. Once this hypothesis is accepted, reliance upon nuclear weapons as the only remaining credible deterrent would increase. As the President is the ultimate authority on decisions concerning nuclear weapons deployment, additional pressures would be exerted upon him as fewer alternatives would be available for action. Apparently convinced that nuclear weapons would be the subsequent step following a US troop reduction, Senator Brock reminded his colleagues of the reason why the US troops were stationed in Europe.

The reason we have troops in Europe is to avoid the use of nuclear weapons, not to use them.

He further challenged the advocates of troop reductions when he asked:

What Senator would be willing to push the first button on the first nuclear weapon?<sup>97</sup>

Fortunately for themselves, and the nation, the Senators are not delegated that responsibility--it lies with the President. Certainly their inputs

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<sup>97</sup> U.S., Congress, Congressional Record, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), CXVII, No. 74, p. S7391.



influence any decision the President makes, but, the actual decision to "push the first button" lies with the President. This is precisely the pressure which may be applied to the President were a troop reduction to occur and the conventional credibility of NATO's forces sufficiently weakened.

The final decision of when and if US troops are reduced also is the ultimate responsibility of the President. Once again, he must be able to withstand the various pressures that will be exerted upon him for the level from which, and the manner in which, troop reductions might possibly be made.

#### INTERNATIONAL TRADE CONSIDERATIONS

Common to both continents, but only briefly mentioned in the respective economic discussions, is the possibility of an economic trade dispute developing as a result of an American reduction. Accompanying the apparent growth of protectionist sentiments within the United States, several legislative bills have been introduced in Congress which have been designed to restrict imports or to revise tariff schedules on a variety of goods. Bootwear, textiles, electronic articles, dairy products, iron and steel products and meats have been most frequently mentioned. On July 20, 1970, despite a statement by President Nixon that he would veto any legislation setting mandatory quotas on any imports except textiles, the Ways and Means Committee, by a vote of 17 to 7, presented to the House of Representatives a bill (H.R. 18970) which, in addition to other provisions, would fix temporary import limits on the quantity of footwear as well as textile.<sup>98</sup> Although this proposed legislation died in the Senate finance committee, it

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<sup>98</sup> U.S., Congress, Sixteenth Meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly, op. cit., pp. 105-106.



represented a newly protective American attitude. Spurred by this American attitude, the entire position of world trade appears to have become slightly more protectionist. With international trade relations tenuous, any US unilateral troop reduction might be interpreted as a definite sign of a US return to isolationism. Should that occur, economic ties might become even more strained.



## CONCLUSIONS

As this study had attempted to illustrate, the possible repercussions of a US unilateral troop reduction are many and varied, both for Europe and the United States. Although any final decision on troop reductions must originate from the President, it is paramount that Congressional and world leaders alike be fully aware of the possible consequences of such an action. Economic conditions throughout Western Europe and the United States might deteriorate. General American credibility, both politically and militarily, could be adversely affected. Europe's entire defense structure might falter and the North Atlantic Alliance possibly unravel. The Soviet Union and its allies, witnessing a weakening in the Western defense posture, might initiate aggressive action in an attempt to achieve their ideological conquest of domination. Mutual balance force reductions, continuing strategic arms limitations talks, and West Germany's "Ostpolitik" may be terminated as a result of a precipitate US action. Additionally, a dramatic world re-orientation might occur with the West leaning East in search of economically-oriented ties.

It would appear from this analysis that any positive agreement for US troop reductions reached by the United States would place the West at a disadvantage. State Department, as well as Defense Department officials concurred with this belief in a January 31, 1972, New York Times article. They further added that nothing short of unexpected Soviet concessions could reduce the likelihood of yielding a substantial advantage to the communist bloc if such an American action were taken.<sup>99</sup> As Christopher Bertram stated in a 1970 issue of World Today:

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<sup>99</sup>"U.S. Aides Now Foresee Peril in Mutual Troop Cut for Europe," New York Times, January 31, 1972.



Detente will, for a long time to come, continue to be characterized by the simultaneous existence of antagonism and cooperation. East and West will be partners and adversaries at the same time. The problem facing any Western government is how to reduce antagonisms without prejudicing security and how to increase cooperation without jeopardizing stability in Eastern Europe.<sup>100</sup>

Until the Soviet Union clearly demonstrates a desire for peace and a willingness to reduce its military strength, it is felt the United States would be foolish to voluntarily reduce its own defense efforts. With the immediate Soviet military threat and superiority as it is, it would appear that, rather than a reduction, an urgent requirement for additional front-line conventional forces exists. As well, a need for more standardization, integration and cooperation in the areas of logistics is apparent.

NATO has two principal purposes: to provide the sense of security that is required for Western Europe's gradual movement toward greater unity, and to provide the stable platform on which East-West relaxation of tension is based.<sup>101</sup> Neither has apparently been fully achieved and neither can hope to be achieved without full and visible US involvement in Western European affairs. Europe is unable to replace the American presence. Even if the NATO allies were willing and able to put a European soldier in place of every American G.I. withdrawn, it could not make up for the deterrent effect inherent in American troops.<sup>102</sup>

If the United States Administration feels it is absolutely necessary to reduce its personnel in Europe, it is hoped that the plans will be long-term, and publicly announced. At least this would allow the NATO and European leaders some time to re-deploy their forces and determine ways of

<sup>100</sup> Bertram, op. cit., p. 120.

<sup>101</sup> Dr. Sommer, op. cit., p. 82.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid.



replacing the diminished fire-power created by the US withdrawal. A reduction evenly spread over several years might also do little damage to either the symbolic commitment of the United States or to its effective conventional contribution. Contrarily, a sudden, arbitrary withdrawal of American forces might affect, not only the conventional credibility of the Western alliance's forces, but, as well, the credibility of the US tactical nuclear guarantee.

As President Nixon is presently witnessing in Southeast Asia, one can not effectively negotiate peaceful settlements from a position of weakness. Were the US to unilaterally initiate troop reductions from Western Europe, as they have done from Southeast Asia (not merely from Vietnam, but as well Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Phillipines), its position of negotiating strength might be weakened. This belief is apparently strengthened by Mr. Henry M. V. Buntinx who warned in his article "Symmetrical Force Reductions Versus European Collective Security":

...those who want the NATO forces to initiate the first stage in troop reductions ... are competing among themselves for the Nobel Prize for Naivety.<sup>103</sup>

One wonders then, what justification there is for the increasing pressures within the United States for a troop reduction from Western Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization?

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<sup>103</sup> Henry M. V. Buntix, "Symmetrical Force Reductions versus European Collective Security," NATO's Fifteen Nations, Vol. 15, No. 5 (October-November, 1970), p. 30.



## APPENDIX I

The Mansfield Amendment H.R. 6531,  
A Bill to Amend the  
Military Selective Service Act of 1967  
(Portions thereof)

## TITLE IV Reduction of US Military Forces in Europe

## Section 401

- a) The Congress hereby finds that the number of US military personnel stationed in Europe can be significantly reduced without endangering the security of Western Europe, and that such a reduction would have a favorable effect on this nation's balance-of-payments problem and would help avoid recurring international monetary crises involving the value of the dollar abroad. It is therefore the purpose of this section to provide for such a reduction at the earliest practicable date.
- b) No funds appropriated by Congress may be used after December 31, 1971, for the purpose of supporting or maintaining in Europe any military personnel of the US in excess of 150,000.



## APPENDIX II

Text of the Treaty on the Renunciation  
of Force Between the Federal Republic  
of Germany and the Soviet Union,  
signed at Moscow on 12 August 1970  
(Portions thereof)

**Article 1**

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics consider it an important objective of their policies to maintain international peace and achieve detente.

They affirm their endeavor to further the normalization of the situation in Europe and the development of peaceful relations among all European states, and in doing so proceed from the actual situation existing in this region.

**Article 2**

The Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall in their mutual relations as well as in matters of ensuring European and international security be guided by the purposes and principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Accordingly they shall settle their disputes exclusively by peaceful means and undertake to refrain from the threat or use of force, pursuant to Article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations, in any matters affecting security in Europe or international security, as well as in their mutual relations.

**Article 3**

In accordance with the foregoing purposes and principles the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics share the realization that peace can only be maintained in Europe if nobody disturbs the present frontiers.

They undertake to respect without restriction the territorial integrity of all states in Europe within their present frontiers.

They declare that they have no territorial claims against anybody nor will assert such claims in the future.

They regard today and shall in the future regard the frontiers of all states in Europe as inviolable such as they are on the date of signature of the present Treaty.



## APPENDIX III

Text of the Draft Treaty  
 Proposed by the GDR included in a Letter  
 from Herr Ulbricht to President Heinemann  
 of the Federal Republic of Germany  
 on 18 December 1969  
 (Portions thereof)

After exchanging their authorizations in an appropriate and seemly form, they have reached agreement on the following points:

**Article 1**

The parties to the treaty agree to the establishment of normal equal relations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany, free of any discrimination and on the basis of generally recognized principles and norms of international law. Their mutual relations are based in particular on the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, inviolability of state frontiers, non-interference in internal and mutual advantage.

**Article 2**

The parties to the treaty mutually recognize their present territorial holding within the existing borders and the inviolability thereof. They recognize those borders in Europe fixed by the result of World War II between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany as well as the frontier on the Oder and Neisse between the German Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of Poland.

**Article 3**

The parties to the treaty pledge to renounce the threat and use of force in their mutual relationship and to solve all disputes between themselves in a peaceful way and by peaceful means.

**Article 4**

The German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons or the disposal of the same in any way.

**Article 5**

The German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany are establishing diplomatic relations.

Appendix II and Appendix III were taken in part from:

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sixteenth Meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly, Report of the United States Delegation to the Sixteenth Meeting of Members of Parliaments from the North Atlantic Assembly Countries held at the Hague, November 6 through November 11, 1970, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., August, 1971 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971),

Appendix II: pp. 43-45.

Appendix III: pp. 47-49



## APPENDIX IV

Partial Text of Franco-Soviet  
Declaration of October, 1970

The two parties consider that detente in Europe should be furthered by the holding of a properly prepared European Conference, which would facilitate the development of close relations and which would mark the beginning of permanent cooperation between all interested states, outside the framework of bloc politics. They consider that such a conference should have as its aim the reinforcement of European security through the creation of a system of undertakings that would exclude any recourse to the threat or the use of force in relations between European states and that would ensure the respect for the principles of the territorial integrity of states, of non-interference in their international affairs, and of the equality and independence of all states. The two parties declare themselves to be in favor of the idea of a European conference...

U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Sixteenth Meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly, Report of the United States Delegation to the Sixteenth Meeting of Members of Parliaments from the North Atlantic Assembly Countries held at the Hague, November 6 through November 11, 1970, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., August, 1971 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 24-25.



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